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“Certain Vowel Sounds”: Beckett’s Not I and Lacanian Phonemics 
Mark Webster Hall 
Structuralist interpretations of language characteristically focus on the sys-
tems in which speech sounds emerge rather than on the existence of such 
sounds as acoustic particles. Neither are such interpretations typically in-
terested in the vocal machineries which body the individual speech parti-
cles forth. The real breakthrough of Ferdinand de Saussure in this regard 
was, as Danny Nobus makes clear, the linguist‘s zeroing in ―more on the 
meaningful function of sounds than on their anatomo-physiological basis.‖1 
Where the domain of parole is a raw hubbub of noises and spittle, we may 
say that that of langue is relatively frictionless and quiet. Structuralist lin-
guistics distances itself from involvement with a history of particular acous-
tic collisions which would otherwise abort the attention given to language 
per se. ―The linguistic sign,‖ as Richard Boothby notes, ―must evacuate its 
own status as an image in order to fulfil its signifying function. The percep-
tual body of the sign is merely a point of entrance, a kind of jumping-off 
point for structured reverberation across the network of relations that con-
stitutes the sign system.‖2 Saussure‘s groundwork on the linguistic sign can 
thus be understood, in part, in terms of its displacement and marginalisa-
tion within the field of inquiry of the individual speech sound. Equally down-
played in the structuralist account is the ―locus of emission‖ of these singu-
lar vocalisations, namely the speech apparatus itself.
3 
What matters is the 
abstract network; certainly, the acoustic mark is recognised as leading to 
that network, but it does not become a meaningful unit of language until (in 
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logical time) it reaches that zone of abstraction.
4
 
Theories of language and subjectivity that build upon structuralist 
foundations in linguistics can be examined very suggestively in terms of 
this principled de-emphasis upon physical speech sound and origin. In this 
paper I would like to interrogate such a theory (that of the Lacanian ―sci-
ence of the subject‖5) by deploying it in a reading of a dramatic text that 
constitutes a strong thematisation of precisely those local, fleshly mechan-
ics of speech that the Saussurean account has relegated to being of sec-
ondary linguistic importance. That text is Samuel Beckett‘s Not I. In its 
dramatisation of a crisis of subjectivity, Beckett‘s play foregrounds the or-
gans of speech working frantically to constitute the subject in language; to 
that extent the text lingers with striking intensity at the coalface of acoustic 
production. Given this, Not I encourages critical inspection of that site as-
sociated with Mladen Dolar‘s identification of ―the voice [which] appears as 
the link which ties the signifier to the body [and which] indicates that the 
signifier, however purely logical and differential, must have a point of origin 
and emission in the body.‖6 By focusing on Not I‘s sustained disclosure of 
speech‘s being physically formed in the production of a subjectivity, I wish 
to explore the extent to which the vocal body (i.e. phonic utterance together 
with speech apparatus) contributes to linguistic meaningfulness and drama-
tised social being. In approaching Jacques Lacan‘s development of linguis-
tic ontology with Beckett‘s play in mind, furthermore, I confront a post-
Saussurean project that stretches the abstraction of signification to break-
ing point with the material particulars of a staged mouth fixedly illuminated. 
This juxtaposing of the intricate logic of Lacanian signification with the 
bright glare of what we might call Beckettian phonetic empiricism provides 
the opportunity for a precise reading of the acoustic mark‘s influence within 
the realm of linguistic subjectivity. 
Lacan‘s construal of the sign‘s relationship to the subject needs to be 
further specified, however, in order within this context to flesh out a reading 
of the phonetic mark. It is only a first step to say, for example, that the La-
canian reading treats ―subjectivity as constituted in and by language, un-
derstood not simply as signification but as temporal chains of signifiers.‖7 
For a radical move is undertaken at this point that, as Tony Thwaites 
writes, empties the Saussurean sign of all content, leaving only the brute 
mark (the unary trait): ―Lacan does indeed abandon and dismantle the very 
idea of a sign, as something which represents something else ([f]or a sub-
ject) and he offers the more cryptic definition of a signifier which represents 
the subject for another signifier.‖8 Jettisoned in the Lacanian treatment is 
thus the sign itself as much as whatever perceptual (or ideational) content 
Saussure may have smuggled into that sign to give it traction. Traction 
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(meaning), for Lacan, comes with the signifier alone ―not because it has re-
course to any signified whatsoever, but because it is now in relation with an 
indefinite and potentially endless [number of] signifiers within the system.‖9 
And signifiers now relate to each other only insofar as they are bare signifi-
ers, for they bear no other properties save that they are such.
10
 Neither the 
acoustic profile, the graphic qualities, nor the mental correlates (if they ex-
ist) of these signifiers play a decisive role within the Lacanian schema;
11
 
the subject is not built out of such materials; all that is needed for the ontol-
ogy are the marks and the logical gaps between the marks.
12
 
For Lacan then, the physical content of the speech sound is bracketed 
off from the main inquiry into language and subjectivity.
13
 It is just as brack-
eted off as Saussure‘s signified is (but no more so). The signifier which 
represents the subject to another signifier may well boast a suite of acous-
tic particles, but those particles do not partake logically in that relation of 
representation; it is not in its capacity as a string of sounds that speech (ei-
ther for Lacan or Saussure) is able to make a linguistic difference. If we 
were to seek a phonemically relevant example of how subjectivity is fash-
ioned in the Lacanian account, we could do worse than revisit Slavoj 
Žižek‘s parsing of how the subject Roger O. Thornhill is mistaken by Rus-
sian spies for ―a nonexistent [CIA] agent named George Kaplan‖ in Hitch-
cock‘s North by Northwest.14 Gesturing ―by pure coincidence‖ to a hotel 
clerk at the same time as said clerk announces ―Phone call for Mr. Kaplan,‖ 
Thornhill is taken for Kaplan by the onlooking Russians.
15
 Žižek takes this 
sequence as an exemplary case of interpellation, arguing that 
the subject is always fastened, pinned to a signifier which represents 
him for the other, and through this pinning he is loaded with a sym-
bolic mandate, he is given a place in the intersymbolic network of 
symbolic relations. The point is that this mandate is ultimately al-
ways arbitrary: since its nature is performative, it cannot be ac-




Now it would seem to make a difference to the logic of this interpellation if 
the signifying chain of the hotel clerk read (in the air) ―Phone call for Mr. 
Gaplan,‖ or ―Phone call for Mr. Chaplan,‖ or even ―Phone call for Mrs. Kap-
lan.‖ The Russian agents could overhear such signifying chains and not 
necessary misrecognise Thornhill as George Kaplan as a result. Their 
hearing of ―Phone call for Mr. Gaplan‖ (not ―Kaplan‖) might put them off the 
chase. These agents may not be motivated so powerfully (so seamlessly) 
thereafter to pursue Thornhill (as Kaplan) because of this slightly off-kilter 
segment of clerkly speech. The clerk‘s phonetic realisation of [kæplǝn] as 
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the signifier ―Kaplan‖ does therefore seem to participate in the pinning of 
―Kaplan‖ onto Thornhill; the realisation of the /k/ of ―Kaplan‖ as [k] (and not 
as, say, [g] or [ʧ]) makes a phonemic difference to the interpellation, which 
is to say that it supports the misrecognition at hand and does not obstruct 
it. 
Does this case provide us with a defeater for the Lacanian claim that 
the acoustic/perceptual content of speech does not partake of the signifier‘s 
charge of representing a subject to another signifier? Well, we have to be 
careful here, for it would be easy to draw conclusions from the Kaplan 
interpellation that are from the Lacanian point of view in no way radical 
enough. While it is true that structuralist linguistics attempts in its theoreti-
cal descriptions to take full account of the functional relationships holding 
between phones (i.e. speech segments measured in terms of their acoustic 
properties: the likes of [k], [g] and [ʧ]) and phonemes (speech segments 
measured in terms of their contribution to linguistic meanings: the likes of 
the /k/ of the ―Kaplan‖ that the Russian spies are waiting for), it is clear that 
Lacan wishes to leave these ―levels of representation‖ behind.17 It is not 
that Lacan favours the phoneme over the phone (as Saussure does), but 
that he wishes to collapse such distinctions altogether and replace them 
with the featureless singularity of the unary trait. That /kæplǝn/ is realised 
as [kæplǝn] (and not, say, as [gæplǝn], or [ʧæplǝn]) would not, strictly 
speaking, be accorded explanatory weight in the Hitchcockian case-study. 
What matters, for Lacan, is that there be a signifier (in this case ―Kaplan‖) 
succeeded by another signifier (in this case the hotel clerk‘s ―Kaplan‖) and 
a gap between them (in logical time). Whether or not the second ―Kaplan‖ 
is phonemically acceptable as phonetically (acoustically) near-identical to 
the first ―Kaplan‖ is irrelevant. To reiterate, what matters is there be a mark 
followed by a second mark; in the Lacanian schema, everything follows 
from the line of traitless signifiers. 
If we are looking for an explication of linguistic ―content‖ (or difference) 
in the Lacanian reading, we really need to turn our attention to the register 
of the symbolic. When Lacan states that ―what is omitted in the platitudes of 
modern information theory is the fact that one cannot even speak of a code 
without it already being the Other‘s code,‖ this can be taken as a rebuke to 
those who hold signification to be of necessity internally complex.
18
 Insofar 
as it is directed to Saussureans, this rebuke attends to whatever ideational 
detritus linguists long to graft onto the sign. Equally vulnerable to this re-
buke, however, are those who wish to locate complexity within the signifier 
itself (at the phonetic level) or within the signifying network as a whole 
(whether at the phonological or at the grammatical level).
19
 Lacan redirects 
our attention from a complexity attributed to language as code to a logical 
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complexity established by virtue of the signifier‘s always coming (at speak-
ers, at subjects) from outside, from a third position (neither signifier nor 
subject).
20 
The sovereign logic of the Lacanian Other is ―th[e] negativity it 
introduces, th[e] distance from the supposed immediacy of experience.‖21  
―The signifier,‖ as Lacan remarks, ―requires another locus—the locus of the 
Other …—for Speech borne by the signifier to be able to lie, that is, posit it-
self as Truth.‖22 The key feature of the complexity that language introduces 
for the subject is therefore not that that complexity is brokered by the infor-
mation with which signifiers are endowed, but that it discloses an appar-
ently endless series of gaps within which the subject emerges piecemeal. 
Complexity arrives not with the likes of ―Phone call for Mr. Kaplan‖ being 
unpacked from elements that include [kæplǝn] rather than [gæplǝn], but 
with that retinue of signifiers inaugurating a predicament where the subject 
(in this case Roger O. Thornhill) is interpellated in (necessarily) contradic-
tory fashion. ―Thornhill‖ will thus be contested by ―Kaplan‖ and ―Kaplan‖ 
(thanks to ―Thornhill‖ and to every other signifier which qualifies as not-
Kaplan) by not-Kaplan. The subject is confronted with a logical bind which 
grooms for self-identificatory gestures along the lines of Žižek‘s imagined 
―‗Why am I what you‘re telling me that I am?‘‖23 The compulsive and baf-
fling qualities of this subject-fashioning logic derives from its being an inter-
pellation, rather than its being a code.  
Within the Lacanian account of linguistic subjectivity the following fea-
tures have been identified that are of present significance: (1) the signifier 
is a mark and is only a mark; (2) the signifier‘s arriving from an indetermi-
nate position introduces the complexity necessary to produce the subject in 
such binding (and unresolvable) questions as Why am I (Kaplan)-and-not-
(Kaplan)-for-you? Both features of the system downplay the complexity that 
may be highlighted either at linguistic surface (phonetic matters) or linguis-
tic depth (phonology, semantics, grammar). The account may be said to 
flatten the linguistic insofar as questions of matter (phone), abstract repre-
sentation (phoneme), and network (language) are transformed into ques-
tions of the bare signifier and its negatively tracked positions in logical 
space. That flattening might also serviceably be read as the degnostifica-
tion of signification, as a Lacanian positing that, with the signifier, nothing 
lies hidden.
24
 Despite this evident argument against linguistic secrecy and 
multilayeredness, I would like to persist with an interrogation of the bodily 
phonetic, and thus of the organs of speech and the sounds that are sum-
moned forth through that fleshly apparatus. There is something at the level 
of the production of the subject in Beckett‘s Not I that remains thorough-
goingly phonetic and that we miss something if we do not account for this. 
With this return to the vocal body, I continue to work through certain as-
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pects of the Lacanian ontology of the subject concerning the performance 
of material speech and its residues. By focusing on Not I from this point 
forth, moreover, I plug away with the question of whether the speech sound 
and its production make a difference to our account of linguistic subjectivity. 
The first thing to note concerning Not I is how pronouncedly the work 
foregrounds linguisticality over subjectivity. In one sense, the play is all 
speakerly apparatus (plus staccato vocal emission) and no speaker. The 
playwright himself described this as his ―‗face play,‘‖ but, in truth, we 
scarcely get even a face—rather what we are presented with, ―on stage, [is] 
a mouth which pours out words that are barely intelligible.‖25 For its part, 
Jennifer M. Jeffers‘s argument that Not I, ―written in English in 1972, … is a 
twenty-minute monologue that furthers Beckett‘s fascination [with] the 
staged disembodied voice,‖ also needs to be qualified by noting that the 
piece dramatises a very precise embodiment of the voice in question.
26
 Or 
at least by our making the case that a very precise embodiment accompa-
nies the voice underscored. For we must grant, logically, with Mladen 
Dolar, that ―the source of [a] voice can never be seen, [that] it stems from 
an undisclosed and structurally concealed interior, [and that] it cannot pos-
sibly match what we see.‖27 Not I confronts us with a mouth (with almost 
only a mouth), with lips, tongue, frenulum, and rogue collocations of spittle. 
The play also discharges in the audience‘s direction a ―gush of ‗wordshit,‘‖ 
a stream of signifiers that clothe the voice and give it shape and acoustic 
parameter.
28
 But the mouth in question need not be said to belong to the 
voice, nor the voice to the overlabouring cavity of gristle. What we have 
therefore, minimally, is a mouth (plus immediate fleshly surrounds) and a 
litany of speech segments which (for us) radiate out from that mouth. What 
we do not necessarily have is a voice (or even any number of voices). 
Partly responsible for this not-necessarily-having-a-voice, as Anthony 
Uhlmann points out, is the dislocation instituted by the play‘s overwhelming 
dramatic focus on the physical cause of speech: ―the mouth in Not I … is 
recognised as a mouth, but the context within which mouths are usually 
represented is now missing. There is a gap, in this case a gap in context, 
which forces us to interpret this mouth as ‗a mouth.‘‖29 What we also do not 
have is a subject. We have a mouth (and a batch of signifiers), but not an 
―I‖ to which we might be tempted to attribute such. 
The environment framing this not-an-“I” at the beginning of the play 
may be sketched briefly. The dramatic subject ―Mouth‖ occupies a central 
and elevated position, the theatrical lights concentrating almost wholly on 
Mouth‘s mouth, with the ―rest of face in shadow.‖30 The only competing 
point of focus on the stage is the dimly lit ―Auditor‖ who is positioned 
―downstage audience left, tall standing figure, sex undeterminable, envel-
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oped from head to foot in loose black djellaba, with hood.‖31 Auditor‘s con-
tribution to the play is restricted to its shrouded epicene presence and the 
mobilisation of three ―helpless gesture[s] of compassion‖ that coincide with 
particularly stressed moments within Mouth‘s monologue. Not I‘s dramatic 
schema therefore insists throughout on the domination of the speakerly ap-
paratus, with a mouth dominating the stage. That mouth‘s domination of the 
play‘s logical architecture is nevertheless a precarious one. For one thing, 
Not I‘s mouth must somehow accommodate the subject ―Mouth‖ without 
being identical to it (to her). Something of this tension between character 
(―Mouth‖) and Mouth‘s body (mouth) is captured in Beckett‘s remark that 
―Mouth‘s speech [is] ‗a purely buccal phenomenon. Organ running away 
with function.‘‖32 Beckett‘s stress here falls upon the physical details of 
Mouth‘s speech needing to be dramatised locally ahead of whatever de-
mand for communication, or signification, may run alongside the specific 
machineries of utterance.  
The organs of speech in Not I thus contain the speech extant in the 
play by virtue of their materiality. Equally restricting are the mouth‘s pres-
sures upon the performer who plays Mouth such that Mouth be dramatised 
first and foremost as ―buccal.‖ As Sarah West records, when Billie Whitelaw 
played the role in the BBC‘s filmed version she   
accepted total immobility and blackout and relied on her visual 
memory to remember her lines. The traumatic situation described in 
Mouth‘s narrative seemed to have been matched by the conditions 
under which the actress had to perform. She sat strapped into a 
chair on a tall podium, her body draped in black, her face covered 
with black gauze, her head clamped between two pieces of sponge 
rubber.
33  
The price of Mouth‘s being dramatised as mouth becomes clear in the re-
strictions I am highlighting here. To accentuate the locus of speech emis-
sion in the monologue, the monologist‘s body is tightly fixed in place. That 
there is something attached to the externally visible (illuminable) organs of 
speech (something behind them, some ―structurally concealed interior‖34—
that there is a neck, a torso, another body) is powerfully de-emphasised. 
This disciplined restriction placed upon the body (other than the mouth) 
may be said to afforce an equal pressure upon whatever mental correlates 
would characteristically be associated with Mouth‘s outflowing speech. At 
times, Mouth does speak of being more than mouth—complaints arise in 
the monologue for instance of ―buzzing‖ noises ―so-called‖ that are regis-
tered ―in the ears‖ and a ―dull roar in the skull‖35—but the play counterposes 
this (slightly) more expansive diegetic identification with the theatrical over-
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determination of the speechly flesh. Empirically, Mouth, for us, is mouth; 
while we may search for subject-positions that extend this correlation, the 
phenomenology of the staged text constantly undercuts such interpretative 
movements. The temptation to interpret Mouth‘s speech as more than a 
purely buccal phenomenon is itself restricted; the dramatology encourages 
readings of the monologue that see it as the work of a speakerly apparatus 
over and above that of a speaker. Where Lacan consistently underscores 
the fact that the signifier in itself is enough to produce the subject, Not I 
privileges the immediate producer (cause) of the signifier such that the sub-
ject becomes displaced (or dispersed) in that linguistic production.  
In response to such a reading, the Lacanian may well argue that in Not 
I‘s dramatising of mouth‘s trumping of Mouth, the speech organ theatrically 
disclosed therein automatically becomes a signifier. Language strings and 
speech sounds ―emerge from‖ this mouth, but (the argument might run) 
there seems no more justification for saying that mouth causes these signi-
fiers than for saying that some interior self or mind causes them. Indeed, 
why valorise the cause relation at all in this context? Would it even matter, 
for example, were mouth feasibly to be said to cause the likes of Mouth‘s 
―… yes … all the time the buzzing … so-called … in the ears … in the skull 
… the dull roar in the skull …‖?36 I think this objection is sound. Sound 
enough, in fact, to favour a reading of Beckett‘s ploy in bringing mouth to a 
position of such prominence in Not I that emphasises the role of defamil-
iarisation over that of local, signification-cause. Our being ―forced to inter-
pret [Not I‘s] mouth as ‗a mouth‘‖ is constituted by our coming to terms with 
mouth simply being there all the time when speech is going on but without 
it (mouth) becoming a subject as a consequence of that utterly basic com-
presence.
37
 Beckett‘s bringing mouth forward, and isolating it, may thus be 
understood as negating in one grisly putsch both the agency of mouth and 
the agency of subject. We are perfectly familiar with speech and mouth ap-
pearing together in daily life. That does not cause us any particular prob-
lems. We neither think that mouth is speaking nor that speech has nothing 
to do with mouth as a result of our noting this inductive juxtapositional fact. 
But when mouth comes forward (and almost everything else is bracketed 
off) as it does in Not I, then we start to have difficulties. We begin to think 
that either the mouth we see is wholly responsible for speaking (i.e. that 
mouth is a subject) or that what we hear is not speech at all. The defamil-
iarisation at work with Not I‘s focus-dominating mouth leads to conclusions 
that either overload subjectivity at the expense of language, or the reverse. 
The logical structure of Not I‘s dramatisation of speakerly subjectivity 
has thus far revealed itself to consist of a mouth fixed in place that it may 
cohabit with other signifiers (the likes of ―… all the time the buzzing … so-
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called … in the ears …‖). That mouth so fixed that it may join these signifi-
ers (dramatically and ontologically) is not a subject when it is ―speaking,‖ 
and it is not speaking when it is taken to be a subject. But the mouth‘s join-
ing that which it was formerly thought to produce (the likes of ―… all the 
time the buzzing …‖) as a signifier has implications for our analysis of 
mouth as a phonetic operator. If mouth is not to be studied in terms of its 
being the cause of a constellation of speech sounds, then it may no longer 
be taken to stand in a phonetic relation to them. There is no phonetic rela-
tion if mouth is a signifier, and ―buzzing‖ is a signifier, and ―so-called‖ an-
other. In a sense, there is no relation at all—other than that which holds be-
tween logical objects (signifiers) whose sole (albeit world-exhausting) con-
tribution is to mark logical space such that the way be cleared for yet an-
other mark. The phonetic has no more traction here than does the linguistic 
in general, or the subjective. To map, for instance, the precise coalition of 
articulatory gestures that might match one phonetic realisation of ―buzzing‖ 
([bʌzɪŋ]) remains unmotivated as a linguistic project if the coalition in ques-
tion is not to be held physically responsible for the speech sound targeted 
for investigation. We can no longer speak of precision (or even of investiga-
tion) when the causal role of the organs of speech is withdrawn, or sus-
pended. In terms of his science of the subject, Lacan would have to re-
spond by saying that this abandonment of precision is justified given the 
improved explanatory power of his account of the negative constructive 
force of the signifier. What explains language‘s subject-fashioning yield is, 
for Lacan, not that [bʌzɪŋ], say, stands in some positive relation to tongue-
lip-and-palatal-coalition X, but that qua signifier it opens the way for an infi-
nite series of nots. ―Buzzing‖ ([bʌzɪŋ]) is not almost everything; it is not 
―Kaplan,‖ it is not ―so-called,‖ it is not ―signifier,‖ it is not ―colourless green 
ideas sleep furiously,‖ and so on. The obdurate fertility of these nots is 
something that is unavailable to phonetic, or even phonemic, analysis. Yet 
it is their logical charge which structures the background of the interpella-
tions calling the subject endlessly forth.  
And Not I dramatises this calling in some intriguing ways given the 
aphonological Lacanian lens through which I am interrogating the play. For 
there are occasions when the sounds of the speech constituting Mouth‘s 
monologue do prompt one‘s interest in determining the conditions of sub-
jectivity disclosed in the play according to phonetic criteria. I would like to 
examine these cases in some depth before making some conclusions as to 
where all this metaphysics of speech leaves us with respect to subjectivity. 
To discover where we are with the monologue in the first place, however, it 
is important to establish something of the performative grammar of Mouth‘s 
speech. The word-strings that constitute that speech resonate in musicality 
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and colour with a good many of the pulsed tropes that make up the mid–
late Beckettian canon: ―… coming up to seventy … wandering in a field … 
looking aimlessly for cowslips … to make a ball …‖ etc.38 Initially, what is 
most important to note of the language outflow as a whole is whose speech 
(or at least whose story) it is taken not to be. The refuser (the disowner) of 
the speech appears to be Mouth herself, its speaker. Mouth‘s distancing of 
herself from ―her own‖ speech (story) betrays a narratological posture en-
dorsed by the playwright himself with his note as to Mouth‘s ―vehement re-
fusal to relinquish third person.‖39 In keeping with this authorial prescription, 
Mouth‘s disowning of this speech may be tracked as it runs through various 
chains of deixis—―… speechless all her days … practically speechless … 
even to herself … something in her begging … begging it all to stop … un-
answered …‖ etc.40 Tensions become acute when this distancing strategy 
appears to be challenged in the repeated and hostile interjection of ―… 
what? … who? … no! … she! …‖ which occasions, separately, the three 
responsive movements of Auditor, a ―simple sideways raising of arms from 
sides and their falling back, in a gesture of helpless compassion. It lessens 
with each recurrence till scarcely perceptible at third.‖41 At these junctures, 
Mouth‘s concession of doubt concerning the subjectivity in crisis (―… what? 
… who? …‖) is promptly overridden by the sharp defensive insistence on 
the third person (―… no! … she! …‖). An interpolation from an unidentified 
logical position—something along the lines of—―The woman whose life you 
speak of is none other than yourself‖—is perchance anticipated by Mouth 
(or by someone [the ―she‖ of the monologue]), and resisted ahead of time. 
Auditor‘s increasingly attenuated expression of ―helpless compassion‖ 
would constitute, in this reading of events, an acknowledgement both that 
Mouth‘s acceptance of the narrative as pertaining to her life is both neces-
sary and (increasingly) unlikely to occur. But I don‘t know that we are fully 
justified in identifying the ―she‖ of Mouth‘s narrative with Mouth on this evi-
dence alone. It is certainly plausible to imagine, after all, the ―not I‖ subject 
exposed in Mouth‘s speech to reverse her position, and, within that mono-
logue, to accept first person, and yet still not to be Mouth. That subject 
would then be an ―I‖—and might thereafter be flagged in the monologue 
with an ―I‖ rather than a ―she‖—but we need not necessarily equate that ―I‖ 
with Mouth on that basis. 
The aporematic nature of this strand of Not I‘s subject-attribution can 
be further examined by paying attention to a case where a provisional ac-
ceptance of first person is dramatised by means of a phonetic linkage to 
that subject‘s past. Analysis of the speech sounds thematised in this accep-
tance provides another useful opportunity to tease open some of the lin-
guistic conditions of subjectivity disclosed in the play. What is particularly 
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suggestive in the case concerned is the openly phonetic nature of the 
memory linked to the concession as to first person. While noises, sounds, 
cries, and murmurs are, after all, standard fare in the oeuvre, the themati-
sation of phonetic qualities is less obviously frequent. Not I is, for its part, 
also richly endowed with noises—―birth cr[ies] to get her going … breathing 
…,‖ ―vent[ing],‖ ―buzzing[s]‖ galore, and the ―dull roar in the skull.‖42 Where 
these are associated broadly (i.e. non-phonetically) with speech, then it is 
typically as the ―buzzing‖ and the ―dull roar[s] like falls‖ that underscore the 
―… steady stream[s] …‖ of ―language‖ that afflict the ―she‖ of Mouth‘s narra-
tive. The speaker is afflicted by both language and prelanguage; the buzz-
ings (and suchlike) capture the range and intensity of this felt burden—they 
act as choric precursors to the more defined ―gush[es] of ‗wordshit‘‖ that 
also flow.
43
 But with words as such come word-segments, and the accents 
and tones inflecting them. Thus, when it is relayed by (or through) the mo-
nologist that ―… words were coming … imagine! … words were coming …‖ 
to the subject not-I, the ―voice‖ in question can only be disavowed up to a 
point. After that a unique phonetic affiliation rings true:  
… words were coming … a voice she did not recognize … at first … 
so long since it had sounded … so long since it had sounded … then 
finally had to admit … could be none other than her own … certain 
vowel sounds … she had never heard … elsewhere … so that peo-
ple would stare … the rare occasions … once or twice a year … al-
ways winter for some strange reason …44 
As we have seen, hitherto ―she‖ has been dramatised (within the 
monologue) as powerfully resistant to the notion that the ―… steady 
streams …‖ that constitute this narrative correspond to an account of her 
life. Now, within that narrative, the ―she‖ is led to confront the fact that the 
―… words [that] were coming …‖ to her are her words. And that confronta-
tion is characterised by the truth induced from empirical phonetic evidence: 
the ―… certain vowel sounds …‖ she hears can only be hers because ―… 
she had never heard [them] … elsewhere.…‖ It is the phonetic individuality 
of these vowel sounds that, for her, make them hers, that betray her to her 
(speaking) self. Qualities she hears (and singles out) in those speech 
sounds ground her tentative movement away from the refusal to accept 
that words heard (―imagine!‖) in this stream of language pertain to a not-I.  
What interests me in this point of not-I‘s (she‘s) acceptance that the 
speech encountered is her own, is whether the pieces of evidence used to 
ground that admission (i.e. certain vowel sounds) can be treated as signifi-
ers or not. Further to this, I would ask whether we understand the phonetic 
values indexed to such vowel sounds in the linguistic procedures of the 
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speaker (―she‖; not-I) to function such that they represent the subject 
(―she‖; not-I) to another signifier. On the face of it, the Lacanian slant of 
such questions leads to their not applying in the present case. In order to 
explicate this we could frame the narratological sequence outlined in the 
vowel-sound recognition dramatisation as follows: a speaker hears speak-
ing going on and then comes to the realisation that it is herself (and no one 
else) speaking when that speaking is going on because the speech sounds 
she hears in that speech boast phonetic values A, B, or C. These phonetic 
values, moreover, belong to her speech (and none hereabouts have been 
known to speak her speech [i.e. the speech of her speech community]). To 
qualify as a Lacanian signifier, however, the certain vowel sounds at issue 
could boast no values (traits) whatsoever, a fortiori they could boast no 
phonetic ones. Now, while this unpacking of the argument may be meta-
physically scrupulous, I think our understanding of the linguistic situation is 
better advanced by letting the Lacanian logic loose on the subjectivity set-
tings implicated herein rather than simply on the relevant phonetic markers. 
The predicament into which not-I (―she‖) is drawn by such paradoxical que-
ries as ―Is that me speaking right now?‖ (―What criterion might I use to de-
cide this?‖) seems to be one ripe for Lacanian investigation. Given this, 
might we not be better off seeking a more productive dismissal of the pos-
sibility of the speaker identifying herself (both as speaker and as herself) by 
means of phonetic induction? I believe that we might be.  
The claim that ―Is that me speaking right now?‖ can lead to clear-cut 
gains for the subject asking the question is one that, I believe, both Beckett 
and Lacan would dismiss. While Auditor‘s gestures may be used, as I have 
suggested, as evidence that such approaches to the truth of third person 
actually being first person are compassion-worthy, there is little sign (in Not 
I or anywhere else in Beckett) that questions of the self will be settled 
thanks to this line of self-directed inquiry. Lacan‘s great insight in this re-
gard, meanwhile, is surely that all speech acts (all signifiers) perform the 
work of preceding other speech acts. That is all, for him, that they can (and 
need) to perform for the subject to emerge. Therefore, even if we grant that 
the distinctly local phonetic variation of a particular speech sound may 
function as a signifier, that signifier‘s force will nonetheless primarily derive 
from its being the simple precursor of other, later marks than from any 
other considerations. As a provident linguistic example, we may take the 
case of the ―striking Irishism‖ of [æ] displacing [ɛ] such that (in Dublin 
speech) the word ―many‖ sounds the same as ―Annie.‖45 If the focus on this 
case is moved back somewhat from its narrowly phonetic context, we can 
see that with [æ] displacing [ɛ] it is evident that the work the signifiers will 
perform here to build upon a specific acoustic particle gain significant lev-
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erage through deferral. Where, for instance, Speaker A overhears Speaker 
B producing ―many‖ and ―Annie‖ as homophones in a particular chunk of 
discourse, she may comment to Speaker C that ―I think B is from Dublin,‖ 
then this would tend to open questions of subjectivity up rather than close 
them off. The questions that may spin off from A‘s observation (the likes of 
C‘s ―Then I wonder why she moved from Dublin to here?‖ and/or A‘s (to C, 
or even D) ―Why do you think she mentioned my coming from Dublin?‖ etc.) 
will inevitably splinter off into multiple tangents that nourish, but also under-
cut, the subjectivities of those language-users concerned and more be-
sides. The arising (in speech) of the phonetic difference ([æ] not contrast-
ing with [ɛ] in Speaker B‘s speech, where it (feasibly) does so contrast in 
that of speakers A and C) is never going to resolve such tangents, even 
when it may be said to have contributed to the triggering of Speaker A‘s ini-
tial ―I think B is from Dublin.‖ The comments and the open questions will 
radiate out regardless of the penetrations into discourse of such linguistic 
properties manifesting themselves (or not) in speech; if there were no pho-
netic (or phonemic) values at all, then (in the Lacanian reading) the signifi-
ers could still do their job fashioning and unfashioning subjectivity.  
Granted, this argument as to the wholesale dispensability of the pho-
nological rather overstates the case. But it does usefully underscore the 
fact that with respect to the logic of the signifier (and of the subject) the 
phonemic domain will never be Lacan‘s first port of analytical call. For the 
project he is involved with when it comes to the signifier is an ontology; it 
thus constitutes much less a linguistics in itself than a foundation of linguis-
tics. The enormously fertile query that motivates so much of the Lacanian 
research programme—namely: ―Once the structure of language is recog-
nized in the unconscious, what sort of subject can we conceive of for 
it?‖46—becomes clearer (as a project) when the structure it points to is 
made plain. To reiterate, it is that structure that furnished the subject where 
the signifier operates, clearing the way for other signifiers. Taken at the 
―grander‖ level of the subject working to make sense of the interpellations 
which endlessly nourish them, endlessly undercut them, this structure may 
be analysed in terms of how its logic of deferral fashions a hole where the 
subject feels they should be. As Sheldon R. Brivic notes, ―supposedly if one 
knows the truth, one will operate rationally; but Lacan points out that the 
truth can only be known in part … and the part that one does not know is 
generally what motivates a person insofar as they have the power to de-
cide.‖47 The ―she‖ (not-I) of Not I is motivated (or compelled) to rehearse a 
life story in which ―she‖ insists ―I‖ need play no part. Analytically, the pre-
dicament of this subject becomes something we can tease out more con-
structively when we recognise (in Lacanian fashion) that both these signifi-
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ers (―she,‖ ―I,‖ ―not I‖) are presenting the subject to another signifier (per-
chance ―she,‖ ―I,‖ ―not I‖ once more) such that the subject becomes a func-
tion of the gaps, the slippages, between the signifiers. It is consequently 
not the case that ―she‖ knows (or discovers thanks to a phonetic induction) 
that ―I‖ is (or is not) ―her‖ and that this knowledge (or discovery) will lead 
―her‖ forth to Beckettian peace and ataraxic contentment. It is rather what is 
not known that produces the subject‘s ceaseless movement through the 
space opened up by speech. More precisely, it is what is negated by virtue 
of speech that produces the subject. The monologue is comprised of a 
truckload of ―she‘s‖ and ―I‘s‖ among many other signifiers: that ―she‖ is not 
―I‖ and that ―I‖ is not ―she‖ is part of what represents the subject. The sub-
ject might best be understood, in fact, as that which is represented by an 
open-ended amalgam of all of these logical-linguistic nots. The dramatisa-
tion of the subject in Beckett‘s Not I captures, I submit, a good deal of this 
construction-through-endless-negation.  
A plausible illustration of this point arrives where the monologue‘s 
―she‖ recalls some of her encounters within particular social contexts. On 
―her‖ part, for a long time these encounters are ―… practically speechless 
…‖ such as that marked at the ―… supermart … just hand in the list … with 
the bag … old black shopping bag … motionless … staring into space … 
mouth half open as usual … .‖48 But there have always been language-
strings at least overheard (by ―she‖), even before the critical moment of ―… 
words were coming … imagine! … words were coming …‖ upon which I 
have already elaborated.
49
 Abandoned at birth (―… parents unknown …‖50), 
the infant  ―she‖ is ―… brought up […] to believe … with the other waifs … 
in a merciful … [Brief laugh.] … God … [Good laugh.] … .‖51 A constituent 
part of that being-brought-up-to-believe is the performative stimulus of the 
time-honoured trigrammaton ―… God is love … .‖52 Such signifiers wash 
against ―her‖ (through ―her‖) with all the others, making space for more. 
Even more forceful as a speech act is one indexing speech itself in (for 
―her‖) pointedly judgemental circumstances, where the ―she‖ faces (myste-
riously) ―… that time in court …‖: ―… what had she to say for herself … .‖53 
In court, facing the magistrate, for some reason the subject is recounted 
being forced to deal with this piece of language: what had she to say for 
herself. The sentence is a beautifully nonchalant and at the same time 
weighty utterance; it reeks of juridicality‘s sovereign malice. Performatively 
complex, it nonetheless demonstrates how the logic of the signifier unfolds 
in action.  
What had she to say for herself. We are encouraged to imagine this 
language-string originally emanating from the judge, on high. This judge is 
asking for speech (―say[ing]‖), but the inflecture of that asking makes the 
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request formidably dismissive. If we translate the request into the present 
tense and fiddle with the deixis to suit we still get a taste of that dismissive-
ness—What have you to say for yourself? (Note also that I have inserted a 
question mark.) The implication even here is that the spoken-to (the ac-
cused ―she‖ in this position) has nothing (important, binding, relevant) to 
say. And one reason for the drawing of this implication is, I believe, that the 
request—What have you to say for yourself?—makes awkwardly salient 
the fact that what is to come as a reply to the request (if it is to come at all), 
will inevitably have to come in the form of speech that begins from the posi-
tion of defending the speaker. It is not an invitation to speak on a subject; it 
is rather the positing of a next-to-impossible obligation (what have you to 
say?) to speak for oneself. All forms of request can be analysed as restric-
tive, of course, but this request is especially so, given its performative 
grammar. Making the restriction even tighter (and more foreboding), natu-
rally, is the discursive context in which it is set—―… that time in court … 
what had she to say for herself … guilty or not guilty … stand up woman … 
speak up woman … .‖ Adding to the unforgiving nature of the prerogative to 
speak is the erasure of the question mark (from my comparison sentence), 
the limitation of possible reply-contents (―… guilty or not guilty …‖), and fi-
nally the transformation of the request into the bluntest of orders (―… stand 
up woman … speak up woman …‖).54 Being told to speak simpliciter (and 
to speak up, to boot) plainly exposes, I submit, the Lacanian logic of the re-
lationship between these speakers (albeit one speechless again, ―… wait-
ing to be led away … glad of the hand on her arm …‖).55 To be asked to 
speak (―Speak!‖) is in this context to be put on the defensive there and 
then; it places an impossible burden on the spoken-to, and what is said 
(whatever it may be; it may be nothing) in reply to ―Speak!‖ can do nothing 
to meet the requirement tabled. 
I believe it is axiomatic to the Lacanian reading of linguistic exchange 
that all speech ultimately decomposes into the off-loading of such impossi-
ble demands from one ―speaker‖ to another (even where and when that 
―another‖ is oneself). Once the signifiers are up and running (which ―once‖ 
is always-already) there really is only the obligation to speak, the impossi-
bility not to speak, and the fundamental logical irrelevance of the content of 
speech. This logical irrelevance applies to the domain of pho-
netic/phonemic content as much as anything else. The brute marks of lan-
guage simply need to be made, and the subjects will thereafter appear in 
between the marks (the unary traits); there is nothing the subjects can do 
with language (or to language) that is not in itself constituted by means of 
the measurely stampede of the signifiers. The language-world of Beckett‘s 
Not I is by no means a hundred million miles away from this excoriating 
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metaphysical account of what it is that takes place when speech ―meets‖ 
the subject. Nested within this play are, after all, complex narratological 
strands of ―voice‖ and of an ―I‖ that insists that it is not the speaking subject. 
Moreover, the work qualifies very much as the treating of a subject who is 
thematised on the basis of her being a product (even a side-effect) of 
speech. ―Mouth‖ speaks that subject. And ―Mouth‖ is theatrically realised 
(almost) stage-exhaustively as mouth. While it is the empirically linguistic 
which is dramatised most emphatically, however, what I have illustrated is 
how boldly it is the logic of linguistic subjectivity that the play above all 
stages. And core insights drawn from a Lacanian ontology have enabled us 
to see this to be the case.    
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